Finitude as Mark of Excellence. Habermas, Putnam and the Peircean Theory of Truth by Gil Martín, Francisco Javier
Ontology Studies 9, 2009 www.ontologia.net/studies 79-89
Finitude as Mark of Excellence. Habermas, Putnam and the 
Peircean Theory of Truth
Francisco Javier Gil Martín
Universidad de Oviedo
Facultad de Filosofía
Reception date / Fecha de recepción: 13-04-2009
Acceptation date / Fecha de aceptación: 22-06-2009
Resumen. Finito como señal de excelencia. Habermas, Putnam y la teoría pierceana de la verdad. 
Hilary Putnam y Jürgen Habermas comparten la convicción de que la finitud de la mente humana 
es una virtud y no una deficiencia. En este trabajo analizo esta convicción filosófica de ambos 
mediante la comparación de sus formas de renunciar a la concepción pragmática de la verdad y con 
una revisión de debate en torno a la objetividad de los valores y normas. 
Palabras clave: objetividad, pragmatismo, realismo, rectitud moral, verdad. 
Abstract
Hilary Putnam and Jürgen Habermas share the conviction that the finitude of the human mind 
is a virtue and not a shortcoming. In this paper I track this shared philosophical conviction by 
comparing their ways of withdrawing the pragmatist conception of truth and by reviewing their 
debate on the objectivity of values and norms.
Keywords: objectivity, pragmatism, realism, moral rightness, truth.
In spite of working in areas rather distant from one another, J. Habermas and H. Putnam 
share some basic assumptions. For instance, both of them have strived to reconnect portions 
of the continental and analytical ways of philosophizing, have rejected the encapsulation 
of highly specialised fields, and have consequently arrived at comprehensive philosophical 
views. Moreover, both philosophers openly declare that they have learned from each 
other and acknowledge the relevance of the other’s philosophical claims for their own 
philosophical discussions. While the last Habermas is particularly indebted to Putnam’s 
internal realism when he articulates his own pragmatic position about the relations between 
truth and justification, Putnam has been interested above all in Habermas’ discourse ethics 
in order to reinforce his own positions in moral and political philosophy. In this article I 
Francisco Javier Gil MartínOntology Studies 9, 2009 80
will approximate to their shared Kantian conviction that the finitude of the human mind 
is not a shortcoming, but a mark of excellence (Habermas 2002a, p. 284). I will do this 
by comparing their renouncing the pragmatist doctrine of truth as ultimate opinion and 
by showing how such withdrawals appear in their debate on values and norms to support 
opposed moral theories.
 According to the Peircean account of truth, a sentence, a belief or a theory are true 
when they form part of an ultimate opinion after a sufficiently lengthy research process. 
In other words, they are true when they could be the result of an agreement reached by 
the community of inquirers as the ideal point of convergence in the scientific research. 
As Charles Sanders Peirce defined it, “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed 
to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth” (Peirce 1960, 5.407), and this 
“opinion that would finally result from investigation does not depend on how anybody 
may actually think” (Peirce 1960, 5.408). Since “the object represented in this opinion is 
the real” (Peirce 1960, 5.407), such idealization of the convergent truth comes to terms in 
the limit with reality: “And what do we mean by the real? … The real, then, is that which, 
sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore 
independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of 
reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, 
without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge” (Peirce 1960, 
5.311). 
 Habermas’s reception of Peirce theories, under the influence of his friend Karl-Otto 
Apel, began during the 1960s and took place especially in the second part of his book 
Erkenntnis und Interesse (Habermas, 1968; 2002b, pp. 206-207). Since the beginning of 
1970s, Habermas developed an epistemic conception of truth heavily indebted to Peirce’s 
pragmatic account of truth (Habermas 1984). This consensus (later called discourse) theory 
of truth was the key piece of the communicative (later called discourse) ethics. In his mature, 
openly Kantian version of this moral theory (Habermas 1985) there were certainly several 
important revisions of his previous account of truth. In particular, Habermas rejected both 
his former idea that the discursive consensus reached in the long run under the ideal speech 
situation works as the criterion of truth of any sentence and his earlier interpretation of 
such speech situation as an anticipation of an ideal form of life. Nevertheless, Habermas 
basically maintained that the justification under the ideal conditions or presuppositions 
of argumentation was constitutive for the truth claims and that truth was ultimately an 
epistemic concept and, as such, only a special case of a wider notion of validity. And he 
stood by the central theoretical strategy of modelling the moral rightness on analogy with 
this anti-realist concept of truth, because this move allowed him to defend a cognitive 
conception for the moral validity of norms uncoupled from any dubious moral facts or 
metaphysical properties. This truth-analogous conception of the moral validity was the 
touchstone for the cognitivism of the discourse ethics.
Ontology Studies 9, 2009 Finitude as Mark of Excellence 81
 In early 1990s, Habermas still defended the discursive version of the Peircean theory 
of truth in order to ensure, by analogy, the cognitive and deontological character of moral 
validity1. Certainly, both dimensions of moral validity define each other: the universal 
bindingness is defined epistemically as what is ideally justified and the binary code of right 
and wrong (analogous to the binary code true/false) is defined in terms of what we all are 
categorically obligated to do or not to do. Habermas reiterated then that the unconditionality 
we associate with truth (and moral rightness) as a validity claim that transcends all possible 
contexts is brought back to a quasi-transcendental presupposition of our discursive 
practices. Besides the projection of an ideal convergence in the long run that works as a 
necessary presupposition into the actual discursive practices of truth-tracking inquiry, the 
unconditionality of validity claims appears as a kind of intramundane transcendence here 
and now. And Habermas again attributed to Peirce this sort of reconciliation with human 
finitude in the view of our parochialism toward future epistemic scenarios. As he wrote in 
the central essay of his book Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik,
Peirce explains truth with the contrafactual reference to the vindication of a 
criticisable validity claim under the communication conditions of a community 
of interpreters that extends ideally across social space and historical time. The 
projection of an unlimited communication community serves to substitute for the 
moment of eternity (or the time-transcending character) of “unconditionality” 
by the idea of an open, but goal-directed process of interpretation that transcends 
the borders of social space and historical time from within, from the perspective 
of a finite existence situated within the world” (Habermas, 1991a, 158)2.
Oddly enough, Habermas also wrote not only in the middle of the 1980s3, but in various 
texts until the mid nineties that such reinterpretation of the pragmatist theory (or a 
slightly weaker version, one that emphasizes the anticipation of rebutting every possible 
1. See Habermas 1990, pp. 125-6, 131-3; 1991a, pp. 120-5, 129-31, 157-9; 1991b, pp. 9-33, 123-6; and 
1992, pp. 28-35, 53-57, 391-2.
2. The translations of German and Spanish quotes in this article are my own.
3.	 Habermas	and	Putnam	met	for	 the	first	 time	during	a	 lecture	the	later	gave	the	summer	of	1980	in	
Frankfurt.	There	was	no	evidence	that	they	knew	each	other’s	works	before	this	time,	as	it	is	evident	
in their major books of 1981 Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns and Reason, Truth, and History. 
Nonetheless, that personal encounter seemed to awake a sense of curiosity and mutual interest. In any 
case,	an	intellectual	sympathy	between	them	was	growing	during	the	following	years	and	it	would	be	
manifest in the last two Paul Carus Lectures of 1985 (Putnam 1987, pp. 41-86), as well as in Haber-
mas’s	conference	of	1987	“Die	Einheit	der	Vernunft	in	der	Vielfalt	ihrer	Stimmen”	(Habermas	1988,	
pp.	153-186).	In	this	text,	Habermas	expressed	sympathetically	his	(Kantian,	but	also	Peircean)	affini-
ties	to	Putnam’s	conception	of	truth	as	idealization	of	rational	acceptability.
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objection4) was compatible with a central thesis of Putnam’s philosophy. The discourse 
theory would have in common with internal realism an epistemic conception according 
to which the truth would be interdependent with the discursive conditions for the ideal 
rational acceptability.
 Certainly, Putnam had previously defended a roughly similar position5. In Reason, 
Truth and History, he understood the truth as a property of propositions that cannot be 
lost and, therefore, as independent and not reducible to justification here and now on 
the basis of the available evidence, but he also argued that truth can be identified as an 
idealization of rational acceptability and that “to claim a statement is true is to claim it 
could be justified”. He even claimed that a statement is true if it would be warrantedly 
assertable under “epistemically ideal conditions”. Moreover he compared such conditions 
with the frictionless planes of the thought experiments in physics, by arguing that -despite 
we cannot really attain such ideal conditions and planes or even be sure that we have come 
sufficiently close to them- talk of them “has “cash value” because we can approximate them 
to a very high degree of approximation” (Putnam 1981, 55-56). Not only Habermas, 
but many others took Putnam as a Peircean or read passages like that as supporting the 
idea that the true belief would be that that would be justified by all the researchers under 
ideal conditions of inquiry. For instance, Richard Rorty still insisted in June 1996 that 
“some actual philosophers, like Hilary Putnam or Jürgen Habermas, attribute to Peirce 
an importance I estimate excessive. Both of them accept Peirce’s definition of ‘truth’ as 
that toward which the opinion is fated to converge at the end of inquiry, as well as Peirce’s 
definition of ‘reality’ as what is believed to exist in such point of convergence. In my 
opinion, this notion of convergence is neither clear nor useful” (Rorty 2000, p. 29). 
 Obviously, this apparent family resemblance should be questioned, at least for two 
reasons: (i) the interconnectedness of truth and justification we find in Habermasian 
writings during the eighties and until the middle of the nineties is different from that 
maintained by Putnam; (ii) and since the beginning of the 1990s Putnam distanced himself 
from his former internal realism and from that time onwards he rejected any radically 
epistemic conception of truth and the pragmatist theory of truth in particular.
 (i) For Habermas, the unconditionality of truth and validity in general is rescued in the 
idealizations built into the pragmatic presuppositions of the argumentation. This implies 
that truth claims and deontological claims are not confined into the spatio-temporal 
context in which they are raised, but their “transcendence from within” works in every 
discourse performance under the supposition of (a surrogate of ) the ideal community 
4. See Habermas 1992, pp. 53-55; 1995, pp. 152-153, 1996, pp. 52-54, 342-343, 354-356, 364; 1998, pp. 
409, 418-419, 426.
5.	See	H.	Putnam	1981,	esp.	chapter	3;	“A	Defence	of	 Internal	Realism”,	 in	Putnam	1990,	pp.	30-42;	
Putnam	1983,	esp.	pp.	vii-xviii,	69-86	y	229-47;	or	“On	Truth”,	in	Putnam	1994a,	pp.	315-29.
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of communication. Thus, Habermas interpretation of the cautionary use of the truth 
predicate, the use that reminds us that the best reasons can be invalidated in light of 
future evidence, does not seem to necessitate any explicit realist compromise, but only the 
idealization of this sort of ideally cross-contextual justification. Putnam on the contrary 
does not admit a Peircean reading of his appeal to the epistemically ideal conditions6. And 
he does not think that the conditions for warranting the truth would be sufficient only if 
they would be ideal, or that such conditions overcome from within the local borders only 
if they approximate sufficiently to ideal conditions. Rather, he thinks “there are better and 
worse epistemic situations with respect to particular statements” (Putnam 1990, viii), and he 
defends that the epistemic conditions necessary for the fixation of truth are ideal only if 
they are sufficiently good.
 (ii) Since the beginning of the 1990s Putnam turns to the natural realism of the 
common man7, while defending a kind of “pragmatism without the pragmatist theory of 
truth” (Hookway 2002, 93). As a successor of the pragmatist heritage, Putnam subscribes 
the main theses of the central classical pragmatists, especially William James and also John 
Dewey: fallibilism and anti-foundationalism, pluralism and anti-scepticism, the rejection 
of pernicious dualisms and dichotomies such as the fact-value dichotomy, and the primacy 
of practice (Putnam 1994a, pp. 151-181). This last thesis, the defense that practice is 
primary in philosophy and the consequent “insistence on supremacy of the agent point 
of view”, can be considered as the very core of pragmatism (Putnam 1987, p. 70). In fact, 
Putnam sees the normative idea of indispensability, internally connected to the priority of 
the first person perspective, as the very heart of pragmatism, both old and new8. However, 
he considers untenable the old theory that the truth is the opinion fated to be accepted as 
the ultimate outcome of inquiry, and he argues that pragmatism today must go without 
the idea that truth can be “defined” in terms of verification. Putnam raises accordingly 
a set of objections against the “classical” identification of the true with what would be 
6.	“Many	people	have	thought	that	my	idealization	was	the	same	as	Peirce’s,	 that	what	the	figure	of	a	
“frictionless	plane”	corresponds	to	is	a	situation	(“finished	science”)	in	which	the	community	would	be	
in a position to justify every	true	statement	(and	to	disconfirm	every	false	one).	People	have	attributed	
to	me	the	idea	that	we	can	sensibly	imagine	conditions	which	are	simultaneously ideal for the ascer-
tainment	of	any	truth	whatsoever,	or	simultaneously	ideal	for	answering	any	question	whatsoever.	I	
have	never	thought	such	a	thing,	and	I	was,	indeed,	so	far	from	ever	thinking	such	a	thing	that	it	never	
occurred	to	me	even	to	warn	against	this	misunderstanding	when	I	wrote	Reason, Truth, and History… 
Thus, I do not by any means ever	mean	to	use	the	notion	of	an	“ideal	epistemic	situation”	in	this	fan-
tastic	(or	utopian)	Peircean	sense”	(Putnam	1990,	pp.	vii-viii).
7.	 	See	Putnam	1992,	pp.	356-357.	The	1994	“Dewey	Lectures”	corroborate	the	turn	from	the	internal	
realism	to	the	new	realist	variation	(Putnam	1999,	pp.	1-70).
8.	“The	heart	of	pragmatism	is	the	idea	that	notions	that	are	indispensable	to	our	best	practice,	are	justified	
by	that	very	fact;	and	in	this	respect,	I	am	a	pragmatist”	(H.	Putnam	1994b,	p.	260).	On	the	importance	
of	the	indispensability	arguments	in	Putnam’s	pragmatism,	see	Gil	and	Vega	2008.
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verified in the long run9. To begin with, this theory has unacceptable consequences, such 
as the well-known one that the truth of statements about past events would depend on 
what will happen or on how the opinion will be in the future. Moreover, there are plain 
truths that cannot ever be confirmed, truths that we know that do not depend on our 
agreement notwithstanding how long we research about them, or probable truths that are 
beyond our capacities for detecting or for verification even under ideal conditions. On 
the other hand, actual science has questioned various metaphysical assumptions of the 
trust on the possibility of finding the right answers if inquiry were indefinitely prolonged, 
such as Peirce’s stipulation that future time is infinite and that no information is ever 
irretrievably destroyed. Finally, Peirce’s -but not James’s- theory of truth could prevent the 
epistemological pluralism, not only because the common end to every researcher seems to 
be solely to contribute to the grown of knowledge, but also because in the end the theory 
requires an “absolute conception of the world” which would demand the God’s Eye View10. 
However, “if the notion of an absolute point of view is unintelligible, then not being able 
to speak from the absolute point of view is not an incapacity” (Putnam 1991, 404)
 This last sentence, with its tribute to human finitude, contrasts with that other of 
Habermas on Peirce we have cited some pages back. However, there is an obvious affinity 
between Putnam and Habermas around the Kantian flavour of such a tribute.
 I have said that, although Putnam had argued from the beginning of the 1990’s 
onwards against the temptation to assimilate truth with warranted assertability even in 
ideal conditions, Habermas maintained until the mid nineties that his own anti-realist 
account of truth was akin to Putnam’s elucidation of the notion in Reason, Truth and History. 
According to Habermas’s position at that time, the procedural conditions of discourse 
do not anticipate a definitive agreement which would make all further argumentation 
superfluous, but they only favour an ongoing process of critical discussion by which 
objections are weakened and the acceptable becomes what survives criticism11.
 However, Habermas gives up his previous, radically epistemic concept of truth in 
Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung as well as in subsequent texts, where he goes on to defend 
a realist and pragmatist account of truth within a new theoretical framework under the 
label of Kantian pragmatism12. He says again that his new position adheres to Putnam’s 
9. See for instance Putnam 1992, pp. 357-8, 363; 1995a, pp. 5-12; 1995b; 1997; 1998; 2002a, 123-124.
10.	See	in	this	respect	the	comparison	between	Peirce	and	Williams	in	“Bernard	Williams	and	the	Abso-
lute	Conception	of	the	World”,	in	Putnam	1992b,	80-85;	see	also	Hookway	2002.
11.	“One	must	conceive	the	discursive	redemption	of	validity	claims	as	a	metacritical,	ongoing process 
of	rebutting	objections.	Here	I	am	attempting	to	use	discourse	theory	to	explain	what	Hilary	Putnam	
has,	 in	the	context	of	philosophy	of	science,	called	‘rational	acceptability	under	ideal	conditions’	”	
(Habermas 1998, p. 418). See the other references cited in note 3.
12.	See	Habermas	1999;	2001a;	2001b,	pp.	153-170;	2003.	Habermas’s	turn	to	Kantian	pragmatism	could	
not	be	developed	without	the	criticism	of	Cristina	Lafont	(1999).
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understanding of realism “as the idea that thought and language can repre sent parts of the 
world which are not parts of thought and language” (Putnam 1994a, p. 299). This time 
the main reasons for this philosophical affiliation have to do with connecting the (non-
epistemic) notion of truth to those of direct reference and discursive justification.
 On the one hand, the notion of truth presupposes reference to a single objective world 
that exists independently of our descriptions and is the same for all of us. This concept 
of reference allows us understand the fact of learning in realist terms, by taking account 
of competing descriptions of the same states of affairs and by making the ontological 
primacy of the ob jective world congruent with the epistemic primacy of a linguistically 
articulated lifeworld13. On the other hand, Habermas now emphasizes that the connection 
between truth and justification is epistemically, but not conceptually necessary: “Although 
we cannot sever the connection of truth and justification, this epistemically unavoidable 
connection must not be turned into a conceptually inseparable connection in the form of 
an epistemic concept of truth” (Habermas 1999, p. 52). The connection is epistemically 
unavoidable because “argumentation remains the only available medium of ascertaining 
truth since truth claims that have been problematized cannot be tested in any other way” 
(Habermas 1999, p. 51). But such connection cannot be conceptually inseparable, because 
truth transcends all possible justification. There is an epistemic access to truth conditions 
in terms of “discursive redemption” of truth-claims, but not an epistemic notion of truth.
While truth is not exhausted by reaching consensus, Habermas does maintain that “an 
agreement about norms or actions that is reached discursively under ideal conditions has 
more than merely an authorizing power; it warrants the rightness of moral judgments. 
Ideally warranted as sertibility is what we mean by moral validity; it not only signifies that 
the pros and cons of a controversial validity claim have been ex haustively considered, but 
it exhausts the meaning of normative rightness itself as the worthiness of recognition” 
(Habermas 1999, p. 297). In contrast with his realist turn and his defense that all language 
users who raise truth claims refer to one and the same world, Habermas continues claiming 
his moral constructivism and still explains the notion of moral justice in epistemological 
terms of ideal justifiability.
 The contrast between truth and rightness has played a role in the debate between 
Habermas and Putnam around the objectivity of norms and values14. Both philosophers 
13.	“Hilary	Putnam	has	dealt	with	the	question	of	how	it	is	possible	for	learning	processes	to	traverse	the	
bounds	of	different	time	peri	ods	and	forms	of	life	specifically	in	terms	of	the	sameness	of	objec	tive	
reference... If an interpretation that was rationally acceptable under certain epistemic conditions is 
to	be	recognizable	as	an	error	in	a	different	epistemic	context,	then	the	phenomenon	to	be	explained	
must	be	preserved	in	switching	from	one	interpretation	to	the	other.	Reference	to	the	same object must 
remain	constant	even	under	different descriptions”	(Habermas	1999,	pp.	44-45).
14.	This	debate	began	with	Putnam’s	paper	“Werte	und	Normen”,	in	Wingert,	Günther	2001,	pp.	280-313.	
There	is	a	slightly	different	version	of	this	text	in	Putnam	2002a,	pp.	111-134.	Habermas’	reply	was	
the	opening	conference	to	the	Symposium	“Putnam	und	die	Tradition	des	Pragmatismus”	(Habermas	
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reject non-cognitivist redescriptions of our norms and values (and of our moral life in 
general) and uphold that the reasons for being ethical are not apparent from a non-ethical 
or external standpoint. However, Putnam argues for a moral realism or, as he prefers to 
call it, for a “moral pluralism” that applies basic pragmatist thesis to the moral contents 
and practices. Besides defending anti-scepticism and anti-foundationalism, this ethical 
position gives good reasons for the indispensability of our normative vocabulary (and of 
the actions and forms of life with which this vocabulary becomes interwoven) and for the 
entanglement of facts, norms and values. Of course, pluralism reaches the very core of this 
moral theory: “It is as if they [most ethicists] wanted to see ethics as a noble statue standing 
at the top of a single pillar. My image is rather different… [T]hat is how I see ethics: as a 
table with many legs, which wobbles a lot, but is very hard to turn over” (Putnam 2004, p. 
28). Putnam’s image of ethics as a system of interrelated concerns has in fact four splendid 
legs, those of the traditions associated with the names of Aristotle, Kant, Levinas and 
Dewey.
 These pluralist and pragmatist convictions move Putnam to argue against the alleged 
dichotomy between norms and values behind the Habermasian differentiation between 
the moral and ethical uses of practical reason. His main objection is that discourse ethics 
both involves an implausible moral minimalism about norms and endorses an ethical anti-
cognitivism or a sociological relativism about values. This objection combines in a new 
way a sort of indispensability argument and a “companions in the guilt” argument (Vega 
and Gil 2008). It claims that evaluative vocabulary is indispensable in our moral form of 
life and that there can be no valid norms without objective values. Therefore, some value 
judgments must be correct, even “true”, for the norms to have content and be valid at 
the same time. In contrast, discourse ethics sees the universal norms as outcomes of the 
filtering moral procedure that would attain their objectivity by neglecting the inevitable 
ethical entanglement of our thin moral concepts with thick terms and by displacing the 
contextual, non-universalizable values as the contingent social outcomes of particular life-
worlds. However, if our evaluative vocabulary is indispensable for the alleged universal 
norms, then joining an ethical relativism about values to a moral minimalism about norms 
would undermine the alleged universal validity of norms. “Relativism of any kind with 
respect to value-terms cannot leave the objectivity of ‘norms’ unaffected” (Putnam, 2002a, 
120).
 On the other hand, Putnam argues that discourse ethics is still trapped in an untenable 
Peircean account of moral truth or rightness. For Putnam, the concepts of truth and 
justification are not linked by definition. Neither truth nor rightness is definitionally the 
outcome of an ideal conduct of inquiry. It was not only that we find difficulties making 
2002a).	This	symposium	held	in	honour	of	Putnam’s	birthday	brought	together	about	sixteen	important	
philosophers	and	experts	in	his	work,	but	his	unique	written	response	was	a	“Reply	to	Jürgen	Haber-
mas”;	see	the	reasons	why	he	singled	out	Habermas’s	paper	in	Putnam	2002b,	p.	306.
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sense of an ideal dialogue without admitting thick ethical terms. It was also that “there is 
no reason to believe that the outcome of an ideal and sufficiently prolonged discussion 
of ethical questions would inevitably be correct” (2002a, p. 126). Consequently, Putnam 
conclude his reply to Habermas claiming that the discourse ethics would be an attempt to 
speak from a God’s Eye View (2002b, pp. 319-320) -the standpoint to which tend by other 
routes Peirce’s conception of truth or Williams’ absolute conception of the world.
 We don’t discuss here Habermas’s responses in defense of the anti-realism of both his 
strong moral cognitivism about norms and his weak ethical cognitivism about values. 
Suffice it to say that objectivity is in both cases an intersubjective result of justificatory 
practices from the common perspective of the participants and not from an external, Eye 
God’s perspective. On the one hand, Habermas insists on the idea that our moral point of 
view grows from within the ethical conditions of a community and its shared form of life. 
Only from this standpoint can we make a distinction internal to our normative discussion 
between the questions regarding justice and the questions regarding goodness, a distinction 
somehow neglected in Putnam’s philosophy. On this view, conceiving objectivity of norms 
as the worthiness of recognition does not entail sacrificing pluralism in behalf of an alleged 
convergence between competing views of the good life. On the other hand, values can 
be rationally debatable in ethical discourses concerning the self-understanding and life-
projects of persons and groups, as when we the affected deliberate to select our best values 
and to identify the common good from the point of view of what is the best “for us”. 
In Habermas’s constructivist account values are objective only insofar as they deserve 
acceptance because are subject to rational scrutiny and intersubjectively recognized by 
means of good reasons. Moreover, values are not completely separate from norms; they are 
authorized by rational procedures and can also be subject to universality constraints.
 Certainly, on Putnam’s realist view values have a sort of “objectivity without objects” 
(Putnam 2004). Habermas was therefore misguided when he objected that Putnam 
would be a thoroughgoing realist (Realist auf ganzer Linie) that treats value statements as 
descriptions (Habermas 2002a, pp. 297-298). Evaluative and normative truths bear on 
reality and are revisable through learning processes, but they are not made true or false by 
(intrinsically non-natural) objects and properties. However, Putnam does uphold that there 
are no recognition transcendent facts in ethics. What is true (or valid) with regard to value 
judgments and to norms does not diverge from what is endorsed by the best justification. 
“In the case of ethics (unlike science), the true view cannot differ from the view for which 
there are the best reasons” (Putnam 2002a, p. 175). Again we can see here the human 
face whose acknowledgment so closely binds Putnam’s and Habermas’s philosophies. Such 
acknowledgment is in fact the beginning of the real discrepancies between them.
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